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B REORGANIZATIONS: THE VOTING
STOCK RULE REVISITED
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (I.R.C.) imposes a tax on all gains
from the sale or exchange of property unless otherwise provided.
1 Con-
versely, certain losses incurred from the disposition of property are
deductible from gross income.2 The corporate reorganization provisions,
3
however, provide important exceptions to these general rules.4 The re-
organization provisions authorize individual and corporate taxpayers to
defer the recognition of specified gains and losses and to treat qualified
reorganizations as nontaxable events.5 The I.R.C. defines six categories
of corporate acquisitions which qualify as "reorganizations" for purposes
of nonrecognition.6 An extremely popular category is the stock-for-stock,
or "B reorganization," which allows the shareholders of an acquired cor-
poration to exchange their shares for voting stock in the acquiring cor-
poration without current tax significance."
The I.R.C. contains three principal provisions governing B reorgani-
zations.8 Section 354 provides that no gains or losses shall be recognized
when, pursuant to a plan of reorganization, shareholders exchange their
stock or securities solely for stock or securities in the same corporation
' I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (gains derived from dealings in property includible in gross income);
id. § 1001 (amount of gain or loss is difference between amount realized for property and ad-
justed basis; gains must be recognized unless otherwise provided).
2 Id. § 165(a) (losses sustained during taxable year are deductible, if taxpayer is not
compensated by insurance or otherwise).
3 . §§ 354-68.
' For a general discussion of the corporate reorganization provisions, see Freling &
Martin, Current Reorganization Techniques, 55 TAXES 852 (1977); Krane, Current Problems
in Acquisitive Reorganizations, 51 TAXES 737 (1973); Darrell, The Use of Reorganization
Techniques in Corporate Acquisitions, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1183 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Darrell].
' I.R.C. § 354(a).
' Id. § 368(a)(1). The six categories of corporate reorganizations recognized by § 368
are statutory mergers or consolidations, stock-for-stock acquisitions, asset reorganizations,
asset transfers under §§ 354, 355 and 356, recapitalizations, and changes in identity, form or
place. See note 4 supra.
' I.R.C. § 368(a)(1l(B). The term "B reorganization" and similar designations for other
corporate reorganizations are derived from the subsection codification. Thus, an asset
reorganization under § 368(a(1)(C) is commonly called a "C reorganization."
The six statutory forms of reorganization accommodate a variety of non-tax business
objectives and plans. See Darrell, supra note 4, at 1183-84; note 6 supra. An A, B, or C
reorganization is employed when the reorganization plan contemplates a permanent com-
bination of the operations or assets of two or more corporations. A B reorganization is
utilized when the acquiring corporation seeks to acquire a subsidiary and to preserve the
subsidiary as a separate corporate entity. See generally Stark, Non-Income Tax Aspects of
Corporate Reorganizations: A Check List of the Issues and Problems, 24 N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED. TAX 1085 (1966); Darrell, supra note 4.
' See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 358(a)(1), 368(a)(1)(B).
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or another corporation party to the reorganization.' Section 358 pro-
vides, in turn, that the shareholders' basis in the voting stock received
shall be the same as the basis of shares transferred, minus any "boot""0
received in the exchange." Thus, shareholders defer recognition of ap-
preciation or depreciation by retaining the original basis of shares in the
acquired corporation. Gain will be recognized to the full extent of the ex-
change, however, if the transaction is not pursuant to a plan of reorgani-
zation, or not qualified as a reorganization under the tax laws. 2
Section 368(a)(1)(B) defines B reorganization as the acquisition by one
corporation, solely in exchange for its voting stock, of shares in another
corporation, if immediately following the acquisition the acquiring cor-
poration has control. 3 Section 368(c) defines "control" as ownership of at
' Id. § 354(a)(1). An exchange of stock normally would involve gains or losses based
upon the relative value of shares, or the enhancement of ownership interest through acqui-
sition of voting rights. Section 354(a)(1) serves to defer recognition in conjunction with a
qualified reorganization. Cf id. § 361(a) (nonrecognition of gain or loss to corporation in-
volved in reorganization); id. § 1031(a) (nonrecognition of gain or loss on exchange of produc-
tive property held for trade, business or investment). Section 354(a)(1) does not, however,
purport to define qualified reorganizations. See note 6 supra.
"0 "Boot" refers to any additional (nonstock) consideration received by the share-
holders in the course of the reorganization. The Internal Revenue Service defines additional
consideration as other property received by shareholders in addition to property permitted
to be received without recognition of gain. Treas. Reg. § 1.356-1(a) (1960).
" I.R.C. § 358(a)(1). See generally id. § 1012 (general rule defining basis in property);
id. § 1011(a) (defining adjusted basis for determining gain or loss); id. § 362(b) (governing
basis of shares received by acquiring corporation). Section 358(a)(1) provides that the basis
of voting stock received must be reduced by any gain recognized to the shareholders. Such
adjustments in the substituted basis, however, usually are not applicable to stock-for-stock
exchanges, since § 368(a)(1)(B) generally precludes nonstock consideration in a B reorganiza-
tion. See note 13 infra.
"2 I.R.C. § 354(a)(1). Nonrecognition is an all-or-nothing proposition for shareholders in
a B reorganization. Section 356 provides generally that if a shareholder receives nonstock
consideration in the course of a qualified reorganization, gain must be recognized only to the
extent attributable to the boot. Id. § 356(a)(1). Section 368(a)(1)(B) usually precludes all forms
of boot in a B reorganization, however, and renders § 356(a)(1) inapplicable to stock-for-stock
exchanges. See note 13 infra. Thus, the presence of boot in a B reorganization disqualifies
the entire transaction from nonrecognition. Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 337, 343
(1961); Lutkins v. United States, 312 F.2d 803, 806 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963).
But see Vernava, The Howard and Turnbow Cases and the "Solely" Requirement for B
Reorganizations, 20 TAX L. REV. 387, 399, 401 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Vernava] (arguing
for recognition only to extent of boot). The harsh result of full recognition is a peculiarity of
B reorganizations. In contrast, participants in a C reorganization can receive up to 20%
nonstock consideration, and recognize gain only to the extent of boot. I.R.C. §§ 356(a)(1),
368(a)(2)(B). Statutory mergers and consolidations under § 368(a)(1)(A) can include substan-
tial cash or other consideration, so long as the transaction is not a sale. See Roebling v.
Commissioner, 143 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 773 (1944) (continuity of interest
requirement in statutory mergers); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(a)-(b) (1976). Thus, A and C
reorganizations accord greater flexibility in planning, and much less risk of disqualification.
See also I.R.C. § 351 (property transferred to corporation in exchange for stock and boot
taxable only to extent of boot.)
1" I.R.C. § 368(a)(1l(B). This section defines a B reorganization as
the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting
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least eighty percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote, and at least eighty percent of all other classes of
stock." Section 368(a)(1)(B) authorizes step-by-step, or "creeping acquisi-
tions," if the series of transactions is pursuant to a plan of reorganization
and the acquisition is completed within a reasonable time.'5 To qualify
for nonrecognition, therefore, a taxpayer must demonstrate that hG and
other shareholders transferred their shares "solely for voting stock,"
and that immediately afterwards the acquiring corporation possessed
the requisite eighty percent ownership in the acquired corporation.
Congress enacted the B reorganization provisions in the Internal
Revenue Act of 1934.6 The primary purposes of this legislation were to
stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a corporation
which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of stock of another corporation if,
immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such
other corporation (whether or not such acquiring corporation had control immedi-
ately before the acquisition);
Id. Section 368(a)(1)(B) contemplates that shareholders of the acquired corporation exchange
their shares "solely for voting stock" in the acquiring corporation or its controlling parent.
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service have construed the term "voting stock" on a
case-by-case basis. See Forest Hotel Corp. v. Fly, 112 F. Supp. 782, 789 (S.D. Miss. 1953)
(common stock precluded from voting because of arrearages on preferred stock is voting
stock; preferred stock voting because of arrearages is also voting stock); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 2 T.C. 827, 829 (1943) (treasury stock can be voting stock); Rev. Rul. 339, 1966-2
C.B. 274 (voting agreements, warrants, options, convertible debentures not "voting securi-
ties").
" I.R.C. § 368(c). The control requirement for B reorganizations may be difficult to
achieve. The 80% requirement for "other classes of stock" is not cumulative, but requires
80% control of each class of nonvoting stock. Rev. Rul. 259, 1959-2 C.B. 115. Section
368(a)(1)(B) expressly states that the acquiring corporation must possess control immedi-
ately after the exchange, whether or not a shift of control results from the reorganization.
When the acquiring corporation has insufficient voting stock to acquire the requisite shares,
the plan may require a reverse acquisition and later recapitalization. See Dailey, The
Voting Stock Requirement of B and C Reorganizations, 26 TAx L. REV. 725, 734 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Dailey]. Furthermore, the I.R.C. does not define the concepts of "total
combined voting power" and "stock entitled to vote." The term "stock entitled to vote"
probably excludes stock with minimal voting rights under local law. In addition, "stock en-
titled to vote" probably does not include stock with contingent voting rights, at least until
the contingency has occurred. See Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a)(3) (1960) (stock with contingent
voting rights not "voting stock" until specified event occurs); Rev. Rul. 339, 1966-2 C.B. 274
(voting agreements, warrants, options, convertible debentures not "voting securities").
"5 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4621, 4911 (discussing allowance for step-by-step reorganizations). According to
the I.R.S., a creeping acquisition must be completed within a relatively short period of time,
such as twelve months. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1960).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g)(1), 48 Stat. 680 (now I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)). The
history of the B reorganization provisions is well documented in congressional reports and
interpretive case law. The Internal Revenue Code of 1924 defined "reorganization" as a
"merger or consolidation" including acquisition by one corporation of a majority of voting
stock and other classes of stock in another corporation. Int. Rev. Code of 1924, ch. 234, §
203(h)(1), 43 Stat. 253 (now I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)). The 1924 I.R.C. authorized nonrecognition
whether or not boot was exchanged in gaining control. Id. To distinguish tax-free reorgani-
zations from sales, the courts developed the "continuity of interest" doctrine which required
1981]
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encourage efficient corporate organization and to facilitate restructur-
ing in the interest of competition.17 These provisions, however, had an
additional objective. Congress was aware that taxable corporate sales
were cast frequently in the form of corporate reorganizations to avoid
the exchange of some quantum of stock in addition to purchase money. E.g., Pinellas Ice Co.
v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d
937, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). The continuity of interest doc-
trine has continued to evolve under a succession of amendments to the Internal Revenue
Code. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); G & K Mfg. Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 389
(1935); Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 860 (1951); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-1(b), 1.368-2(a) (1960). As developed by the courts, con-
tinuity of interest requires both a substantial continuity in proprietary interest, and a sub-
stantial participation by shareholders of the acquired corporation. See Commissioner v.
Berghash, 361 F.2d 257, 259-60 (2d Cir. 1966) (50%/ reduction in participation by share-
holders terminates continuity of interest); note 72 infra.
Widespread tax avoidance under the 1924 provision resulted in amendment under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1934. See Int. Rev. Code of 1934, ch. 277, § 112(g)(1), 48 Stat. 680
(now I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)). The report of the House Ways and Means Committee observed that
the 1924 Act permitted reorganizations to take a wide variety of forms without income tax
liability. H. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
704]. As a result, astute lawyers took advantage of the reorganization provisions by arrang-
ing corporate sales in the technical form of tax-free reorganizations. Id. See also S. REP. No.
558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 558]. The 1934 revision
therefore provided that the acquiring corporation must acquire, solely in exchange for its
voting stock, at least 80/o . of the acquired corporation's voting shares and other classes of
stock, or substantially all the property of the acquired corporation. Int. Rev. Code of 1934,
ch. 277, § 112(g)(1), 48 Stat. 680 (now I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B)-(C)). With these revisions, Con-
gress intended to eliminate tax avoidance in conjunction with corporate sales, and to con-
tinue the policy of encouraging stock-for-stock and asset reorganizations. H.R. REP. No. 704,
supra, at 14. The 80% control requirement and the "solely for voting stock" rule were thus
designed to restrict nonrecognition to a limited number of reorganizations by emphasizing
the substance of the transaction rather than the form.
Congress amended the reorganization provisions again in 1939, to clarify the status of
assumed liabilities and to nullify the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Hendler,
303 U.S. 564 (1938). Hendler held, inter alia, that the assumption of liabilities by an acquir-
ing corporation was equivalent to an exchange of boot, and would disqualify an otherwise
tax-free reorganization. Id. at 567. To overcome this obstacle, Congress separated the treat-
ment of stock and asset reorganizations and expressly forgave the assumption of liabilities
in asset reorganizations. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, § 213, 53 Stat. 863 (now I.R.C.
§§ 368(a)(1)(B-(C)).
The 1954 Code further refined the reorganization provisions. To allow step-by-step or
creeping acquisitions, Congress abandoned the single-transaction requirement for B
reorganizations. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4911 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1622]. See I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1960). In addition, Congress amended the provision
governing asset, or C reorganizations, to allow up to 20% boot including liabilities assumed.
I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(C), 368(a)(2)(B). Congressional policy toward nonstock consideration in B
reorganizations conformed to prior law, but remained somewhat ambiguous. See S. REP. No.
1622 at 273, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4682.
" Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1964); see H.R. REP. No. 704, supra
note 16, at 14. The role of the reorganization provisions in encouraging corporate mergers
may conflict in some instances with the antitrust laws. See note 37 infra.
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recognition of gains.18 Thus, Congress enacted the "solely for voting
stock" language and the eighty percent control requirement to limit
nonrecognition to bona fide reorganizations. 19 These restrictions circum-
scribed the availability of stock-for-stock acquisitions, and set limits on
the general policy favoring reorganizations. Construction of the "solely
for voting stock" rule is therefore critical to the balance that Congress
intended to achieve between the encouragement of reorganizations and
the prevention of tax avoidance." 
The courts traditionally have given strict construction to the "solely
for voting stock" requirement in section 368(a)(1(B).22 As developed by
the courts, the doctrine of strict construction has precluded the transfer
of any nonstock consideration in qualified stock-for-stock exchanges.'
Recently, the First and Third Circuits reaffirmed strict construction of
the voting stock rule and overturned lower court decisions challenging
the vitality of this judicial doctrine.24 In Chapman v. Commissioner' and
Heverly v. Commissioner,8 the First and Third Circuits held that acqui-
sition of stock by an acquiring corporation must be exclusively in ex-
18 S. REP. No. 558, supra note 16, at 15; H.R. REP. No. 704, supra note 16, at 13.
,1 H.R. REP. No. 704, supra note 16, at 14.
2 Id.
I See Comment, The "Solely for Voting Stock" Requirement of B Reorganizations:
Reeves v. Commissioner, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 793-96 (1979) (discussing balance of con-
flicting purposes in § 368(a)(1)(B)) [hereinafter cited as Voting Stock Requirement].
' Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792, 806 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 238 F.2d
943 (7th Cir. 1956); see Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 198 (1942)
(strict construction of statute governing B and C reorganizations); Swanson v. United
States, 479 F.2d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1973) (requirements for reorganization are detailed and
precise, and must be specifically met); Simon v. United States, 402 F.2d 272, 279 (Ct. Cl.
1968) (all criteria for § 368 reorganization must be met).
1 24 T.C. at 806. The traditional construction of the "solely for voting stock" rule
focuses on the consideration paid by the acquiring corporation for the shareholders' stock.
The payment of nonstock consideration directly or indirectly in exchange for stock in the ac-
quired corporation renders the reorganization a taxable event. Id. Transfers made to the ac-
quired corporation or its shareholders, however, in exchange for debt instruments or assets
of the acquired corporation, may not violate the voting stock rule. See Rev. Rul. 269, 1970-1
C.B. 82 (exchange of stock options severable from B reorganization); Rev. Rul. 91, 1969-1
C.B. 106 (exchange of debentures involving few shareholders severable from stock-for-stock
exchange). Furthermore, a transfer in respect of treasury stock, while indirectly benefiting
shareholders of the acquired corporation, does not result in disqualification. Rev. Rul. 522,
1972-2 C.B. 215.
2 Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856, 862 (1st Cir. 1980), vacating, Reeves v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727 (1979); Heverly v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227, 1246 (3d Cir.
1980), rev'g, Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727 (1979); Pierson v. Commissioner, 472 F.
Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1979). The appeal in Chapman and the consolidated appeals in Heverly
arose from a common factual situation. See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra. For discus-
sion of the Reeves decision, see Thurmond & Horvitz, Nonstock Consideration in a "B"
Reorganization: the Reeves Case, 11 TAx ADVISOR 232 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Thurmond
& Horvitz]; Voting Stock Requirement supra note 21.
618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980).
621 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1980).
1981]
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change for voting stock if shareholders of the acquired corporation are
to defer recognition of gains.' The courts further held that the require-
ments for a B reorganization are not met where an acquisition includes
nonstock consideration, even though over eighty percent of the stock is
exchanged for voting stock in the acquiring corporation.' In so ruling,
the courts reaffirmed strict construction of the "solely for voting stock"
requirement and conformed to the long-standing Supreme Court deci-
sion in Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corporation.'
The Chapman and Heverly decisions are significant because they re-
establish the conventional strict construction of the B reorganization
provisions. The influence of these decisions, however, is somewhat un-
certain. For many years, the federal courts have engrafted de minimus
exceptions to the "solely for voting stock" rule, reflecting both the ex-
igencies of the commercial world" and judicial discomfort with the statu-
tory requirements.3 The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) also has
adopted a nontechnical construction on a case-by-case basis." The B
reorganization provisions have therefore remained a source of uncer-
tainty in the tax law, despite successive reenactments by Congress and
repeated judicial construction.'
The Chapman and Heverly cases arose from a common set of facts in-
volving acquisition of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford)
618 F.2d at 856; 621 F.2d at 1228. The Chapman and Heverly courts, respectively,
vacated and reversed decisions by the lower courts authorizing nonrecognition in stock-for-
stock exchanges involving up to 20% boot. 618 F.2d at 877; 621 F.2d at 1246. The circuit
courts remanded the cases for consideration of an argument not on appeal. See note 40
infra.
618 F.2d at 856; 621 F.2d at 1228.
" 315 U.S. 194, 198 (1942). Southwest Consolidated was an asset reorganization case
arising under § 112(a)(1)(B) of the 1934 Revenue Act. 315 U.S. at 195. The same provisions of
the 1934 Act governed stock-for-stock and asset reorganizations. See note 16 supra. Con-
fronted with the "solely for voting stock" language, the Court ruled that "solely" leaves no
leeway, and that voting stock plus some other consideration does not meet the statutory re-
quirement. 315 U.S. at 198. Despite the separation of asset and stock-for-stock reorganiza-
tions under the 1939 Revenue Act, the I.R.S. and the courts have continued to apply strict
construction to the B reorganization provisions. E.g., Turnbow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S.
337, 341 (1961); Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792, 806 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 238
F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956); Rev. Rul. 123, 1975-1 C.B. 115.
' See Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1964). Mills held that cash
payments for fractional shares did not disqualify an otherwise valid B reorganization. Id.
The court reasoned that the payment of boot for fractional shares was an administrative
convenience, and did not constitute an independent part of the consideration. The court
declined to decide whether a de minimus ruling otherwise would have been warranted. Id.
at 325. See text accompanying notes 100-106 infra.
" See Heverly v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227, 1243, 1245 (3d Cir. 1980) (desirability of
voting stock rule unclear).
E.g., Rev. Rul. 365, 1976-2 C.B. 1101; Rev. Rul. 54, 1973-1 C.B. 187 (payment of
reorganization expenses by acquiring corporation); Rev. Rul. 562, 1968-2 C.B. 157 (permit-
ting majority shareholder in acquiring corporation to purchase 50/o of target corporation
two months prior to reorganization). See text accompanying notes 100-106 infra.
' See note 16 supra.
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by International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT).4 Appellees were
among 17,000 shareholders of Hartford who exchanged their shares for
voting stock in ITT, pursuant to an offer by ITT in May of 1970. ITT first
proposed merger in October, 1968. The Hartford management rejected
this proposal, however, and in November ITT began purchasing Hart-
ford shares on the open market. By March of 1969, ITT had secured
nearly eight percent of Hartford's single class of stock.35 Negotiations be-
tween the companies continued throughout 1969, and a final plan of
reorganization was presented to Hartford shareholders on May 23, 1970.
The shareholders overwhelmingly approved the proposal, relying in part
upon a private letter ruling by the I.R.S. granting conditional approval
of the plan." The merger resulted in the exchange of more than ninety-
five percent of Hartford stock for ITT's cumulative convertible voting
preferred stock.
In March, 1974, the I.R.S. retroactively revoked approval of the re-
organization and assessed deficiencies. 7 Various shareholders contested
the revocation, as reported in Reeves v. Commissioner' and Pierson v.
Commissioner.39 The petitioners presented two arguments. First, the
shareholders argued that the cash purchases by ITT were severable
from the subsequent stock-for-stock exchange, and that the exchange of
shares was therefore "solely for voting stock."40 Second, the petitioners
' 618 F.2d at 857; 621 F.2d at 1228. The Commissioner has two other appeals pending on
the same facts as Chapman and Heverly. Reeves v. Commissioner, No. 79-1438 (4th Cir.,
argued Feb. 6, 1980); Coffen v. Commissioner, appeal docketed, No. 79-7278 (9th Cir. June
18, 1979).
618 F.2d at 858; 621 F.2d at 1228.
618 F.2d at 858; 621 F.2d at 1228-29. The Commissioner approved the tax-exempt
status of the ITT-Hartford reorganization in April, 1969, upon condition that ITT dispose of
its 8% interest in the Hartford. Pursuant to the letter ruling, ITT sold the Hartford shares
to an Italian bank prior to the stock-for-stock exchange. 618 F.2d at 858; 621 F.2d at 1228-29;
cf. Rev. Rul. 354, 1972-2 C.B. 216 (approving similar divestiture in B reorganization). See
generally Rev. Proc. 22, 1980-26 I.R.B. 26 (June 30, 1980) (guidelines and procedures for
advance rulings).
, 618 F.2d at 858; 621 F.2d at 1229. The I.R.S. cited misrepresentations concerning
ITT's sale of stock to the Italian bank because of the latter's participation in the subsequent
stock-for-stock exchange. 618 F.2d at 859; 621 F.2d at 1229. For purposes of appeal, the par-
ties in Chapman stipulated that ITT's cash purchases would be treated as part of the overall
acquisition effort. See note 40 infra.
The ITT-Hartford reorganization was also challenged by the Department of Justice for
violation of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976). United States v. I.T.T. Corp., [1971]
Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,666 (D. Conn. Sept. 24, 1971). In a negotiated settlement, ITT re-
tained Hartford subject to the divestiture of several smaller subsidiaries and certain
restrictions on future acquisitions in the insurance industry.
I Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727 (1979), vacated sub nom. Chapman v. Commis-
sioner, 618 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Heverly v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227
(3d Cir. 1980).
" Pierson v. Commissioner, 472 F. Supp. 957 (D. Del. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Heverly v.
Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1980).
40 71 T.C. at 731; 472 F. Supp. at 960. The Reeves and Pierson courts never reached
the shareholders' argument that ITT's cash purchases were severable from the stock-for-
19811
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argued that even if the cash purchases were part of the same acquisition,
the fact that over eighty percent of Hartford shares were exchanged
"solely for voting stock" satisfied the requirements of section
368(a)(1)(B)." The lower courts granted summary judgment on the basis
of petitioners' second argument.'2 Both courts held that where a single
stock-for-stock exchange results in more than eighty percent acquisition,
the requirements of section 368(a)(1)(B) are satisfied, regardless of boot.'3
stock exchange. For purposes of appeal, the taxpayers in Chapman stipulated that the ITT
purchases were part of the overall reorganization effort. Chapman v. Commissioner, 618
F.2d 856, 859 (1st Cir. 1980). In Heverly, the shareholders continued to assert on appeal that
the cash purchases were severable from the plan of reorganization. Heverly v. Commis-
sioner, 621 F.2d 1227, 1246 (3d Cir. 1980). These shareholders also argued that even if the
purchases were part of the reorganization plan, they were separate "transactions" and
severable from the "acquisition" under § 368. Id. at 1231 n.3; see Voting Stock Requirement
supra note 21, at 800-02 ("acquisition" under § 368 includes stock and boot "transactions").
Both circuit courts remanded the cases for further consideration of the severability issue.
618 F.2d at 877; 621 F.2d at 1246.
The argument that ITT's purchases are severable from the plan of reorganization
derives from express language in § 368 and certain principles underlying the step-transac-
tion doctrine. Section 368 provides that acquisitions of stock must be in pursuance of a
reorganization plan to qualify for nonrecognition. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). See generally Mann-
ing, "In Pursuance of the Plan of Reorganization" The Scope of the Reorganization Provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code, 72 HARv. L. REv. 881 (1959). The courts have applied
principles from the step-transaction doctrine to determine which events in a series of trans-
actions are pursuant to a plan of reorganization. In general, transactions in excess of 12
months duration have been held ineligible for qualification, unless the transactions are part
of a continuing offer by the acquiring corporation. American Potash & Chemical Corp. v.
United States, 402 F.2d 1000, 1001 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Lutkins v. United States, 312 F.2d 803,
804-05 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825 (1963). Thus, transactions occurring beyond the 12
month limit usually cannot be included in determining whether requirements have been
met. 402 F.2d at 1001. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1960) (B reorganizations must be com-
plete within relatively short time, such as 12 months).
The facts in Chapman and Heverly provide some support for the shareholders' severa-
bility argument. ITT's cash purchases of stock preceded agreement with Hartford concern-
ing the reorganization. 618 F.2d at 858; 621 F.2d at 1228. ITT first initiated the cash pur-
chases of stock after the Hartford management rejected a merger proposal by ITT. 618 F.2d
at 857; 621 F.2d at 1228. Furthermore, the series of transactions which led to the stock-for-
stock exchange extended over a period of 14 months, two months beyond the period the
I.R.S. will look for qualified transactions. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
41 71 T.C. at 731-32; 472 F. Supp. at 961. Petitioners construed § 368(a)(1)(B) to require
that stock in the acquired corporation be exchanged "solely for voting stock" to the extent
necessary to acquire "control" (80%). 71 T.C. at 731-32; 472 F. Supp. at 961. The share-
holders argued that "solely for voting stock" refers specifically to the acquisition of control
and not to the plan of reorganization as a whole. 71 T.C. at 731-32; 472 F. Supp. at 960-61.
Under the shareholders' view, acquisition of 80% control through a stock-for-stock ex-
change ensures that the acquisition is not a corporate sale, and that the continuity of inter-
est requirement is substantially fulfilled. See note 16 supra. The same argument was raised
and rejected in Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792, 803 (1955), rev'd on other grounds,
238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956). See generally Vernava, supra note 12, at 399 (discussing rela-
tionship between control requirement and voting stock rule).
4 Pierson v. Commissioner, 472 F. Supp. 957, 975 (D. Del. 1979); Reeves v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 727, 742 (1979).
" 71 T:C. at 741; 472 F. Supp. at 975. The reasoning in Pierson is instructive. The Pier-
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The First and Third Circuits rejected the lower courts' construction
of the statute and remanded the cases for further consideration." The
First Circuit, in Chapman, found the presence of boot totally inconsis-
tent with tax deferral, whether or not such purchases were necessary to
acquire control."5 The court then held that in order to qualify for non-
recognition of gain, a transfer of stock in a B reorganization must be ex-
clusively in exchange for voting stock.'
The Chapman court's reasoning is not complex. The court conceded
that the language of section 368(a)(1)(B) lends itself to several interpreta-
tions. 7 Relying on precedent, however, the court ruled that Southwest
Consolidated and the Tax Court's decision in Howard v. Commissioner8
compel adherence to strict construction of the "solely for voting stock"
rule. 9 The Howard decision was the linchpin of the Chapman court's
analysis." In Howard, the Tax Court held that an acquiring corporation's
son court distinguished Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942), by
arguing that because Southwest Consolidated involved an asset reorganization, the case
was inapposite to interpretation of § 368(a)(1)(B). 472 F. Supp. at 974. The court further sug-
gested that the 1954 amendments to § 368(a)(1)(C) superceded the Southwest Consolidated
decision, and reflected congressional discontent with strict construction of the "solely for
voting stock" rule. Id. at 974-75; see note 16 supra. The Pierson court reasoned that since
Congress permitted up to 20% boot in asset reorganizations, an equivalent amount should
be permissible in B reorganizations absent a clear rule to the contrary. 472 F. Supp. at 973;
see note 12 supra. The Pierson court inferred an 80% rule for B reorganizations from the
statutory history governing C reorganizations. See note 16 supra. The Pierson reasoning,
and similar logic in Reeves, has been criticized heavily by some commentators. See Thur-
mond & Horvitz, supra note 24, at 240; Voting Stock Requirement, supra note 21, at 797-98.
" Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856, 877 (1st Cir. 1980); Heverly v. Commis-
sioner, 621 F.2d 1227, 1246 (3d Cir. 1980). Both the Chapman and Heverly courts remanded
for consideration of the severability issue. See note 40 supra.
,5 618 F.2d at 862.
" Id. at 856.
'7 Id. at 863. The Chapman court recognized two possible constructions of § 368(a)(1)(B),
including the Tax Court's construction in Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727 (1979).
Reeves held that a qualified reorganization occurs whenever the acquiring corporation
exchanges sufficient voting stock to attain 800/o control, even if the acquiring corporation
purchases other stock for cash. 71 T.C. at 741. The second possible construction is the "pre-
scriptive" or strict construction, which interprets "solely for voting stock" to mean that a B
reorganization must be entirely free of nonstock consideration. According to the Chapman
court, neither construction is compelled by the language of § 368(a)(1}(B). 618 F.2d at 863.
" Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 238 F.2d 943
(7th Cir. 1956).
618 F.2d at 872.
" See id. at 869. Howard involved a B reorganization under § 112(g)(1)(B) of the 1939
Act (now I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B)). 24 T.C. at 792; see note 16 supra. The Truax-Traer Coal Com-
pany entered into an agreement to acquire the Binkley Coal Company and Binkley's sub-
sidiary, Pyramid Coal. The plan of reorganization included a direct stock-for-stock exchange
of unissued Truax-Traer voting stock for 80.19% of Binkley's outstanding shares. 24 T.C. at
800. Truax-Traer purchased the remaining Binkley shares for cash, with one Binkley share-
holder receiving both stock and boot. Id. The issue in Howard was whether the "solely for
voting stock" language in § 112(g)(1}(B) referred to the entire relorganization, or only to the
80% control requirement. 24 T.C. at 803.
Except for dictum in Commissioner v. Air Reduction Co., 130 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir.),
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cash purchases of stock preclude qualification as a B reorganization,
even though over eighty percent of the acquired corporation's shares are
exchanged solely for voting stock." The Howard court further held that
achievement of control through a bona fide stock-for-stock exchange is
not alone sufficient to fulfill the purposes of the reorganization provi-
sions."
The First Circuit found Howard indistinguishable from Chapman and
dispositive of the issue on appeal.5 3 The lower court in Reeves had dis-
tinguished Howard based on the receipt of "mixed consideration" by a
shareholder in the acquired corporation,5 and on the ground that
Howard involved a single transaction rather than several stages.' The
First Circuit found, however, that mixed consideration was irrelevant to
the outcome in Howard," and that severability was inapposite to the
Chapman appeal. 7
The First Circuit also rejected the lower court's emphasis on the
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942), Howard was the only decision prior to Chapman and
Heverly to confront the relationship of the 80% control requirement to the "solely for
voting stock" rule. See Vernava, supra note 12, at 388 (discussing issue addressed in
Howard).
", 24 T.C. at 792. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's construction of the
"solely for voting stock" rule, reversing on other grounds. Howard v. Commissioner, 238
F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956). The Seventh Circuit relied on a 1934 Report of the Senate Finance
Committee and the Supreme Court's decision in Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated, 315
U.S. 194 (1942), to affirm strict construction of the voting stock rule despite separate treat-
ment accorded stock and asset reorganizations under the 1939 Act. 238 F.2d at 946; see S.
REP. No. 558, supra note 16, at 16-17; note 16 supra.
11 24 T.C. at 804. In Howard, the former shareholders of the acquired corporation had
reported long-term capital gains on subsequent sales of stock in the acquiring corporation,
predicated on a substituted basis and lengthened holding period. Id. at 800-01; see I.R.C. §
1223 (rules governing holding period for property received in exchange). The shareholders
argued that the 80.19% exchange of stock and recognition of long-term gains substantially
fulfilled the purposes of the reorganization provisions. Id. at 804. In opposition, the I.R.S.
argued that the shareholders should have recognized gain on the reorganization exchange,
and reported short-term gain on the subsequent sales of stock. Id. at 801.
618 F.2d at 871.
" Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727, 737 (1979). One shareholder in Howard re-
ceived both voting stock and boot in exchange for his shares in the acquired corporation.
Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792, 800 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 238 F.2d 943 (7th
Cir. 1956); see note 50 supra. The Reeves court reasoned that the acquiring corporation in
Howard had failed to attain 80% control of the acquired corporation "solely for voting
stock" because "mixed consideration" had tainted the stock-for-stock exchange. 71 T.C. at
737. In contrast, the Reeves court found that Hartford shareholders in the exchange with
ITT had received either voting stock or cash, but not both. Id. at 741-42.
71 T.C. at 736.
' 618 F.2d at 872. The Howard Court made no finding of fact regarding mixed con-
sideration and based its holding on entirely different grounds. See 24 T.C. at 792; text ac-
companying notes 51-52 supra.
' 618 F.2d at 872. The distinction between single step and creeping acquisitions was
largely eliminated by the 1954 amendments to § 368(a)(1)(B). See note 16 supra. The distinc-
tion, if relevant at all, relates to the issue of severability which the Reeves court failed to
address. See note 40 supra.
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passage of control, finding such emphasis inimical to the 1954 amend-
ments.' The Tax Court in Reeves had ruled that the transfer of eighty
percent control in one transaction satisfied the purposes of section
368(a)(1)(B), and distinguished the ITT reorganization from earlier case
law. 9 The First Circuit found, however, that emphasis on acquiring an
eighty percent block of shares frustrates the intent of Congress to treat
step-by-step acquisitions the same as other B reorganizations."0 The
court reasoned that the transfer of control is irrelevant under the pres-
ent statute, so long as the acquiring corporation possesses control upon
completing the reorganization.' The First Circuit held, therefore, that a
single, eighty percent exchange of stock does not relieve the share-
holders from the requirements of the voting stock rule.2
Finally, the First Circuit criticized the Reeves court's statutory con-
struction and understanding of the legislative history. The Reeves opin-
ion suggested that the relaxation of requirements for asset reorganiza-
tions in the 1954 amendments should apply to B reorganizations. 3 The
First Circuit, however, viewed the 1954 amendments as an effort by Con-
gress to treat each form of reorganization separately, and to grant lee-
way only as Congress directed." Similarly, the circuit court considered
the allowance for "creeping acquisitions" to be a matter of legislative
grace, not intended to weaken the "solely for voting stock" rule.65
618 F.2d at 864-65.
" Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727, 741 (1979).
1 618 F.2d at 864. The Reeves decision may be criticized for attempting to create a
special exception to the step-transaction doctrine whenever 800/ control passes in a single
stock-for-stock exchange. The step-transaction doctrine requires that a series of events be
treated as a single transaction and accorded uniform tax significance whenever a common
purpose or design links the events. See generally Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Cor-
porate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 247 (1954). Congress intended that the
step-transaction doctrine apply to corporate reorganizations, especially with regard to
creeping acquisitions. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 16, at 273, [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4911; see Rev. Rul. 16, 1973-1 C.B. 186 (applying step-transaction doctrine to D
reorganization under 1939 Act). The Tax Court in Reeves, however, seemingly has recog-
nized an exception by according separate tax significance to ITT's stock and cash acquisi-
tions. See Voting Stock Requirement supra note 21, at 800 (discussing application of step-
transaction doctrine to "acquisitions" under § 368(a)(1)(B)).
6 618 F.2d at 864. The last phrase of § 368(a)(1)(B) expressly precludes any require-
ment for passage of control. See note 13 supra. Thus, the Tax Court's emphasis on the trans-
fer of control is irrelevant to qualification under the statute, and is not a valid method of
distinguishing the ITT case from earlier precedent.
618 F.2d at 864.
Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727, 738-39 (1979). C reorganizations can include up
to 20% boot, including liabilities assumed. I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1}(B), 368(a)(2}(B); see note 16
supra.
618 F.2d at 876; see note 16 supra.
Id.; cf. Commissioner v. Air Reduction Co., 130 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 681 (1942). Air Reduction involved a step-by-step or creeping acquisition under §
112(g)(1}(B) of the 1934 Act. See note 16 supra. The acquiring corporation achieved 82.9%
control through successive stock-for-stock exchanges, and purchased the remaining shares
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The Third Circuit's opinion in Heverly v. Commissioner" is in
general accord with the Chapman holding. First, the Heverly court re-
jected the implication in Reeves and Pierson that the settled construc-
tion of section 368(a)(1)(B) is irrational." Second, the court found that the
construction of the "solely for voting stock" rule in Southwest Consoli-
dated applies to B reorganizations." Third, the Heverly court found
error in the lower courts' interpretation of congressional intent, and in-
ferences drawn from adjacent provisions governing C reorganizations. 9
The Third Circuit reasoned that Congress has recognized important
differences between stock-for-stock exchanges and other forms of re-
organization, and has intentionally created independent statutory re-
quirements for each form. 0 Thus, the court found that successive
reenactments of clause B have indicated a congressional intent to retain
the traditional construction of the "solely for voting stock" rule."'
In addition, the Heverly court found error in associating the "con-
tinuity of interest" doctrine'2 with the "control" requirement in section
368(a)(1)(B).7" Both the Reeves and Pierson courts had found that eighty
percent control satisfies the requirement for continuity of interest in a B
for cash. 130 F.2d at 146. The court applied the strict construction doctrine of Helvering v.
Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942), and held that the acquisition was dis-
qualified under § 112. 130 F.2d at 148. Unlike the court in Chapman, however, the Second
Circuit in Air Reduction found that the acquiring corporation had been dealing in its own
stock, and had employed treasury shares as an ordinary asset in a variety of transactions.
130 F.2d at 148.
621 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id at 1232.
Id. at 1234. The Reeves court distinguished Southwest Consolidated as an asset
reorganization case. 71 T.C. at 736-37. The Pierson court distinguished Southwest Consoli-
dated on similar grounds, emphasizing the separate treatment accorded stock and asset
acquisitions under the present statute. 472 F. Supp. at 969, 974-75; see note 16 supra. On ap-
peal, the shareholders argued that Southwest Consolidated involved 37/0 nonstock con-
sideration, far more than the 8/o involved in the ITT-Hartford acquisition. 621 F.2d at 1234.
" 621 F.2d at 1243-45. The Third Circuit rejected inferences drawn from the treatment
of statutory mergers and consolidations under § 368(a)(1)(A). Id.; see Roebling v. Commis-
sioner, 143 F.2d 810, 814 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 773 (1944) (continuity of interest re-
quirement for statutory mergers).
" 621 F.2d at 1243-45.
71 Id.; Voting Stock Requirement, supra note 21, at 799. But see Commissioner v. Air
Reduction Co., 130 F.2d 145, 147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942) (successive re-
enactment of reorganization provisions not adoption of administrative interpretation).
72 The "continuity of interest" doctrine is of judicial origin, and requires that the
shareholders of the acquired corporation retain a continuing interest in the reorganized cor-
poration. See note 16 supra. Factors to be considered include continuity of the business
enterprise, shareholder control in the reorganized corporation, duration of continuing inter-
ests, participation in earnings, and ownership of assets. Since the courts require a substan-
tial proprietary interest, the exchange of short term notes or similar obligations generally is
insufficient. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1960); cf. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 287 U.S. 462, 468-69 (1933) (promissory notes not "securities" under reorganization
provisions).
" 621 F.2d at 1241.
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reorganization." The Third Circuit distinguished these elements as con-
ceptually independent, however, and ruled that continuity of interest
relates to the entire consideration of the exchange. 5 The court reasoned
that the control requirement of section 368 and the continuity of interest
doctrine serve divergent congressional policies and require independent
satisfaction."
In sum, the Chapman and Heverly decisions reflect a cautious read-
ing of the legislative history, deference to precedent, and adherence to
the traditional construction of the voting stock rule. The circuit courts
found that strict construction supports congressional policy and pro-
motes stability and certainty in the tax laws." Both courts rejected at-
tempts by the lower courts to create a special exception to the step-
transaction doctrine78 and to depart from established case law.79
Despite the reasoning in the Chapman and Heverly decisions, strict
construction of the "solely for voting stock" rule poses at least three
problems for businessmen, attorneys, and the courts. First, the reestab-
lishment of strict construction in Chapman and Heverly fails to ensure
stability and certainty in the administration of the tax laws. The judicial
doctrine of strict construction has not prevented inconsistent application
of the "solely for voting stock" rule.0 The I.R.S. and the courts fre-
quently have adopted a case-by-case approach to B reorganizations and
have discarded strict construction in a variety of fact situations.8 As in
many situations in which an exception has been made, the transfer of
boot in Chapman and Heverly was minor compared to the overall con-
sideration.2 The voting stock rule,i therefore, remains a source of con-
7, See text accompanying note 41 supra.
7 621 F.2d at 1241-43.
Id -L at 1243. The Third Circuit found that Congress intended the control requirement
to insure a substantial change in corporate form, while the "solely for voting stock" rule was
designed to insure continuity of interest. Id. The court further found that modification of
corporate form is an independent requirement of the reorganization provisions. Id.; cf
Scofield v. San Antonio Transit Co., 219 F.2d 149, 154 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
823 (1955) (C reorganization provisions contemplate modification in corporate form). Thus,
the court rejected the shareholders' argument that the voting stock rule relates to the con-
trol requirement, and held that both the voting stock and control requirements must be
independently satisfied. Id at 1243, see Howard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 792, 804-06 (1955),
rev'd on other grounds, 238 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1956) (rejecting relationship between voting
stock and control requirements); Swanson v. United States, 479 F.2d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1973)
(requirements for § 368 reorganization are detailed and precise, and must be met specifi-
cally); Simon v. United States, 402 F.2d 272, 279 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (all criteria for § 368 reorgani-
zation must be met).
618 F.2d at 874; 621 F.2d at 1232.
" 618 F.2d at 869; 621 F.2d at 1229, 1245-46; see note 60 supra.
See notes 49 & 68 supra. But see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106; 119-20 (1940)
(discussing limits of stare decisis in construction of tax legislation).
" See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 100-106 infra.
618 F.2d at 858; 621 F.2d at 1228. The nonstock consideration in Chapman and
Heverly constituted less than 80/o of the total value exchanged. 618 F.2d at 858; 621 F.2d at
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siderable uncertainty in corporate tax planning.
A second problem which arises from the Chapman and Heverly deci-
sions is that strict construction only partially fulfills the purposes of the
reorganization provisions. Section 368(a)(1)(B) serves two disparate ob-
jectives in corporate tax policy.83 The primary function of the reorgani-
zation provisions is to encourage reorganization and to strengthen cor-
porate structures by eliminating negative tax consequences.' Congress
added the voting stock rule in 1934 to prevent shareholders from dis-
guising corporate sales as bona fide reorganizations and avoiding other-
wise taxable gains. 5 At the same time, Congress unintentionally facili-
tated the recognition of losses by strictly circumscribing the conditions
for nonrecognition." After 1934, the statute struck an uneasy balance be-
tween conflicting policies and rendered administration of the tax laws
exceedingly complex. 7
Rather than reflecting Congress' intended balance between encour-
aging reorganizations and limiting tax avoidance, strict construction of
the voting stock rule serves almost exclusively to eliminate the avoid-
ance of gains." The general policy favoring corporate reorganizations,
while not wholly frustrated, is subordinate to the dictates of an inflexi-
ble judicial doctrine. The strictures placed on B reorganizations render
qualification exceedingly difficult, particularly where the corporate par-
ties are large and complex, or the shareholders have divergent inter-
ests." Furthermore, strict construction affords taxpayers a ready
1228. Furthermore, ITT had divested itself of all shares purchased with cash prior to the
stock-for-stock exchange. 618 F.2d at 858; 621 F.2d at 1229; see note 36 supra.
See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1964); see text accompanying note
17 supra.
S. REP. No. 558, supra note 16, at 15; H.R. REP. No. 704, supra note 16, at 13.
See Dranginis, Tax Planning, 3 CORP. L. REV. 123, 124 (1980) (discussing intentional
transfer of boot to insure recognition of losses). Section 356(c) prohibits recognition of loss
by shareholders who receive both property and boot pursuant to a plan of reorganization.
Participants in a B reorganization, however, can insert small amounts of boot in an other-
wise qualified exchange and disqualify the entire reorganization. See note 12 supra. Thus,
taxpayers can manipulate the requirements of § 368(a)(1)(B) to facilitate the recognition of
losses. This "loophole" in § 356(c) derives from the strict qualification requirements of §
368(a)(1)(B), and is founded on the same construction which precludes limited recognition of
gains. See generally Voting Stock Requirement, supra note 21, at 793-96 (discussing §
356(c)); note 12 supra.
" Turnbow v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 669, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 368 U.S. 337 (1961); see text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
The 80% requirement arguably is sufficient to preclude nonrecognition in corporate
sales, to fulfill the requirement for change in corporate form, and to insure substantial con-
tinuity of interest. See Heverly v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d at 1243 (statutory requirements
higher than necessary to serve congressional policies). One commentator has suggested that
recognition of gain in circumstances involving less than 20% boot results in unjustifiable
hardship for shareholders who continue to risk substantial portions of their capital. Ver-
nava, supra note 12, at 399.
" See text accompanying notes 100-106 infra.
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formula for tax avoidance whenever loss recognition is desired. Con-
trary to the intent of Congress, taxpayers can include small amounts of
boot in a stock-for-stock acquisition and ensure recognition of losses in
an otherwise qualified exchange. 0
The statutory language does not compel such anomalous results.9
The Congress has not articulated a preference for strict construction of
the voting stock rule.9 The decisions in Chapman and Heverly espouse a
long-standing judicial preference for strict construction in order to pro-
mote stability and certainty in the tax laws.9 A more balanced and flexi-
ble construction, however, would better serve the goals of Congress. 4
A final problem resulting from the Chapman and Heverly decisions is
that strict construction presents practical dilemmas for working attor-
neys and reduces certainty in reorganization plans. Acquisitions rarely,
if ever, involve a simple stock-for-stock exchange absent other contrac-
tual settlements or inducements. Reorganization plans include the dis-
tribution or liquidation of assets, continuation of employee contracts or
benefits, renewal of leases for equipment or land, payments to non-
assenting shareholders, and other ancillary matters.9'5 Where the ac-
quired corporation is closely-held, the beneficiaries of such agreements
are frequently shareholders prohibited from receiving boot.
Strictly construed, the "solely for voting stock" requirement does not
easily accommodate commercial imperatives such as asset liquidations,
contract extensions, and shareholder payoffs. The sweeping prohibition
See note 86 supra.
9' 618 F.2d at 863; 621 F.2d at 1240, 1245-46; see I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B).
92 618 F.2d at 876. The 1954 report of the Senate Finance Committee contains language
which seems to authorize the receipt of boot by shareholders in all corporate reorganiza-
tions. See note 16 supra. Nevertheless, the Chapman court found that the legislative history
of the reorganization provisions contains no clear guidance for construction of the voting
stock rule. 618 F.2d at 876. Cognizant that § 368(a)(1)(B) may be an "overreaction" to the
problem of corporate sales, the court laid responsibility for reform on the Congress. 618
F.2d at 876.
'3 618 F.2d at 876; 621 F.2d at 1232.
9, See note 16 supra.
" See Dailey, supra note 14, at 776 (discussing reorganization complexities and side
transactions).
", See Stockton Harbor Indus. Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 638, 645 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 349 U.S. 904 (1954) (discussing loan to shareholder of closely-held farm). The status
of side transactions is rendered even more uncertain when obligations are later terminated
by payment rather than by performance. Uncertainty is increased, for example, when share-
holders of the acquired corporation bargain for lengthy employment contracts. If the con-
tracts are terminated at a later date, the I.R.S. can characterize the settlement as boot.
Under such circumstances, qualification under § 368(a)(1)(B) may be uncertain for years.
In Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968), the Supreme Court stated that the
essential character of a transaction should not depend upon uncertain future events. Id. at
96. According to the Court, Code provisions must conform to the basic premise of annual tax
accounting and should not remain indeterminable and unfixed for indefinite periods. Id. The
strict requirements of § 368(a)(1)(B), however, often preclude such certainty.
' See Dailey, supra note 14, at 776 (discussing § 368(a)(1)(B) and side transactions).
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of Southwest Consolidated is often too inflexible to meet the complex re-
quirements of reorganization. 8 The courts and the I.R.S., therefore, have
recognized a variety of practical exceptions to the voting stock rule.,
The acquiring corporation may purchase unissued shares from the ac-
quired corporation for boot,"' and may pay the reorganization expenses
of the acquired corporation. 1 Fractional shares may be purchased for
cash where the shareholder's interest is not divisible by the value of
voting stock exchanged."' Nonassenting bondholders may be paid off in
cash or assets of the acquired corporation.0 3 The acquired corporation
may distribute excess assets to shareholders in the form of a redemp-
tion.' A majority shareholder in the acquiring corporation may pur-
'" See Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 198 (1942); note 29
supra.
" See Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 727, 740 (1979) (discussing exceptions to voting
stock rule).
"ll Rev. Rul. 522, 1972-2 C.B. 215, See also Roosevelt Hotel Co., 13 T.C. 399, 408-09
(1949) (purchase of unissued shares in C reorganization).
... Rev. Rul. 54, 1973-1 C.B. 187.
.02 Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1964); Rev. Rul. 114, 1971-1 C.B.
133; Rev. Rul. 365, 1966-2 C.B. 116. The Mills court held that the payment of cash for frac-
tional shares was an administrative adjustment and justified by principles of.accounting.
331 F.2d at 323; see note 30 supra.
... Rev. Rul. 285, 1968-1 C.B. 147; see Southland Ice Co., 5 T.C. 842, 850 (1945). South-
land Ice involved an asset reorganization under § 112(g){1)(B) of the 1934 Act and subsequent
amendments. See note 16 supra. The acquired corporation was in receivership, and the
bondholders' committee adopted a reorganization plan subject to the committee's acquisi-
tion of corporate property at the foreclosure sale. 5 T.C. at 844. As the transaction devel-
oped, almost 940/0 of the bondholders in the acquired corporation participated in the
reorganization, and received 100% of the income bonds issued by the successor corporation.
5 T.C. at 847. Nonassenting bondholders were Paid off in cash by the receiver out of income
accumulated during the receivership and prior to creation of the successor corporation. Id.
The Tax Court held that the reorganization qualified for nonrecognition notwithstanding
that a small minority of nonassenting bondholders were paid in cash out of funds retained
by the receiver. Id. at 842. The court distinguished Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated
Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942), by holding that the funds retained and used to pay off the bond-
holders were not additional consideration. 5 T.C. at 850.
Most state corporation laws provide a procedure for eliminating dissident share-
holders by calling-in or redemption. See, e.g., A.B.A.-A.L.I. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 68, 80
(1979); Rev. Rul. 345, 1956-2 C.B. 206. Prohibiting this procedure under § 368(a)(1)(B) makes
little sense, since under the proper circumstances both pre- and post-reorganization redemp-
tions are authorized by state law. See Daisy M. Ward, 29 B.T.A. 1251, 1254 (1934) (redemp-
tion two days after reorganization severable from stock-for-stock exchange); Vernava, supra
note 12, at 298. See also I.R.C. §§ 371, 372 (reorganization in receivership and bankruptcy
proceedings; payoffs to bondholders and other creditors).
'0 Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968); American Potash & Chemical Corp. v.
United States, 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1968). I.R.C. § 355 governs the distribution of corporate
stocks and securities during reorganization and may be used to distribute unneeded assets.
See Massee, Section 355: Disposal of Unwanted Assets in Connection With a Reorganiza-
tion, 22 TAX L. REV. 439 (1967) (discussing nonrecognition in simultaneous divisive and uni-
fying reorganizations); Piper, Combining a Spin-off With a Merger-Recent Developments,
49 TAXES 134 (1971) (discussing risks in combining corporate division and merger).
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chase substantial amounts of stock in the acquired corporation for
cash."5 Furthermore, the acquiring corporation may loan cash to a share-
holder in the acquired corporation and incorporate the loan into the
reorganization plan.'
The Chapman court dismissed the relevance of these exceptions,
labeling them "minor deviations."''0 Nevertheless, the established excep-
tions to strict construction and related unresolved issues challenge the
vitality of the voting stock rule. In many instances, ancillary agreements
are important inducements to reorganization and contribute a signifi-
cant element to the overall consideration. 8 So long as the language of
"I Rev. Rul. 562, 1968-2 C.B. 157. Revenue Ruling 562 demonstrates the inconsistency
with which the I.R.S. has applied the reorganization provisions. An individual owned 90% of
the acquiring corporation and only two months prior to reorganization purchased 50% of
the "target" corporation's outstanding shares. The Commissioner found that the individual
was acting "for his own account" and held that the subsequent reorganization qualified
under § 368(a)(1)(B). 1968-2 C.B. at 158.
"' Stockton Harbor Indus. Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 638, 645 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 904 (1954). In Stockton Harbor, the acquired corporation was a closely-held
farm reorganizing under § 112(g(1(B) of the 1939 Act. 216 F.2d at 638, 645. In the course of
the reorganization effort, a director of the acquiring corporation agreed to lend the principal
shareholder of the acquired corporation $20,000, to be secured by voting stock which the
shareholder was about to receive. Id. at 642. The plan of reorganization included this "side
transaction," and the monies lent passed through escrow in conjunction with the acquisition.
Id. at 641, 645.
"I Chapman v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 856, 876 n.41 (1st Cir. 1980). The government
conceded that an "overly technical" construction of the "solely for voting stock" rule fails to
support congressional policy. Reeves v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 740; see text accompany-
ing notes 83-90 supra. One commentator has distinguished the exceptions to strict construc-
tion by arguing that § 368(a)(1)(B) focuses on consideration paid by the acquiring corpora-
tion, and not consideration received by the shareholders. Voting Stock Requirement, supra
note 21, at 786. Thus, distributions of property and cash prior to reorganization are allow-
able because the transaction does not involve a transfer from the acquiring corporation.
E.g., Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (distribution of assets by acquired cor-
poration prior to reorganization); Southland Ice Co., 5 T.C. 842, 851 (1945) (payment by
receiver of acquired corporation to nonassenting bondholders prior to reorganization).
The focus on transfers by the acquiring corporation, however, exhalts form over sub-
stance. Section 354 governs the nonrecognition of gains and losses of shareholders. The
technical source of the boot is irrelevant if the distribution is in respect of stock and related
to the overall reorganization plan. See Rev. Rul. 360, 1975-2 C.B. 110 (pre-reorganization
redemption by acquired corporation constitutes additional consideration in stock-for-stock
exchange). A distribution by the acquired corporation prior to reorganization depletes the
assets of the corporation and affects the value of shares to be exchanged. The shareholders
are compensated for the diminished value of their shares by participation in the distribution
and investment in the reorganized corporation. A pre-reorganization distribution is there-
fore equivalent to a transfer of boot for shareholders who participate in both the distribu-
tion and the subsequent stock-for-stock exchange. The emphasis on consideration paid by
the acquiring corporation also fails to explain many of the established exceptions to the
voting stock rule. See, e.g., notes 105-106 supra.
IN See Dailey, supra note 14, at 776. Dailey argues that contract inducements should
not be characterized as boot, if commercially justified and not simply designed to benefit
shareholders in the acquired corporation. Dailey also would allow side transactions pro-
posed as conditions precedent to reorganization. Id.
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section 368(a)(1)(B) is strictly construed, such agreements will require
special determination by the Commissioner or the courts."9
The decisions in Chapman v. Commissioner and Heverly v. Commis-
sioner reaffirm the long-standing construction of section 368(a)(1)(B) and
represent a sound interpretation of leading precedents. Strict construc-
tion of the "solely for voting stock" requirement, however, underscores
conflicting policies contained in the present statutory scheme, and ex-
acerbates problems associated with qualification as a B reorganization.
Although the present interpretation is largely a creature of judicial con-
struction, the courts have chosen not to deviate from precedent.11 Ab-
sent judicial or congressional action, however, certainty in the law
regarding B reorganizations will remain a distant goal.
MICHAEL LEE UNTI
" As Reeves and Pierson suggest, a more flexible construction of § 368(a}(1)(B) would
reduce uncertainty by accommodating limited nonstock consideration in side transactions,
and would facilitate the elimination of nonassenting shareholders and the assumption of cor-
porate liabilities. Allowance of up to 200/ boot would provide planners a margin of error
without jeopardizing congressional policies. See Vernava, supra note 12, at 399.
I See Helvering v. Hallock, 209 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940) (absence of congressional
repudiation does not preclude courts from reconsidering judicial construction of tax legisla-
tion, when construction conflicts with intrinsically sounder doctrine).
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